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JOSEPH NALVEN*

Transboundary Environmental
Problem Solving: Social Process,
Cultural Perception
INTRODUCTION

Both sides of the United States-Mexico border have experienced economic and population growth, matched unfortunately by an increase in
environmental problems. In 1983, Presidents Reagan and de la Madrid
developed an agreement to address border environmental problems. Despite this agreement, there are few linkages between United States and
Mexican government agencies at the federal, state, or local level to deal
effectively with these transboundary environmental problems.
From a technical perspective, the formula for success combines a rational problem definition, good will, and adequate funding. Technicians
in Mexico and the United States recognize that respective national priorities are significantly affected by the quantum difference in economic
capability: the United States is a developed nation, while Mexico still
confronts the problems of underdevelopment.
However, the way in which cultural perceptions and social process
affect cooperation proves to be more of a puzzle. Social scientists are
not members of transboundary problem solving efforts. As a result, cultural and social factors are not subjected to any systematic analysis and
remain, at best, good common sense and, at worst, perjorative stereotypes.
Cooperation, at its root, is not a technical affair, but social. Social
relationships, in turn, are framed by cultural expectations of what is
correct and acceptable. Mexican and United States technicians bring cultural understandings about the pace, direction, and depth of desired cooperation: How much information, for example, is necessary to identify
a problem? How much information should be shared? How much lead
time is necessary? What perception does each hold of the other, affecting
their willingness to participate in joint projects? What is an equitable
division of costs? How should equal status in making project decisions
be tempered by differences in resource contributions, if at all? These are
fundamental assumptions about cooperation, assumptions which invite
not only a planner's or an engineer's commentary about what is "technically" apropos, but the commentary of social scientists on the elements
which cement and the elements which distort that relationship.
*Institute for Regional Studies of the Californias, San Diego State University.
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This article examines two border environmental problems. The frustration that participants experience in transboundary problem solving efforts suggests a social process model can be useful in anticipating, and
possibly avoiding, social tensions in future projects. The systematic analysis of cultural data illustrates how the social relationship is influenced
by specific attitudinal differences between United States and Mexican
technicians. This article argues that joint border projects would be
strengthened to the extent that participants engage in a process of "translating the border"-its imagery, social expectations, jurisdictional responsibilities and processes, as well as the oft-cited difference in resources.
THE UNITED STATES-MEXICO BORDER CONTEXT
The United States-Mexico border, nearly 2,000 miles in length, can
be viewed politically as a place where "the tangle of domestic and foreign
affairs comes home to roost with a vengeance. "'This situation is created
in large part by the antagonism of two realities. In Washington, D.C.
and Mexico City, the international boundary is viewed as hard-edged.
However, in the border region itself, the boundary is viewed as semipermeable, permitting and at times even encouraging both legal and illegal
flows of people, capital, and produce.2 Even the U.S. State Department
notes that "[s]tates and localities are more likely to undertake actions
that run counter to national objectives." 3
Outside of the border region the most salient perception of the area is
probably that of it being a migratory sieve. Undocumented or illegal
immigration has become a thorn in the United States national consciousness. The symbolically open welcome of the Statue of Liberty is giving
way to a wish for a border fence, signifying the desire to control the
integrity of the national boundaries and to move away from a de facto
skewing of immigration policy by certain industries and employers in the
United States. This desire for immigration control is partly motivated by
the fear held by some groups that the environment, language, and the
body politic itself will be degraded by excessive and uncontrolled immigration.'
1. Fagen, How Should We Think About the Borderlands?: An Afterword, 9 NEW SCHOLAR 271,
272 (1984).
2. Stoddard, Northern Mexican Migration and the U.S. -Mexico Border Region, 9 NEW SCHOLAR
51, 64-65 (1984).
3. D. Simcox, T. Martin, K. McCune, & Spielman, U.S.-Mexico Border Cooperation 30 (1978)
(U.S. Department of State mimeo).
4. E. Stoddard, 0. Martinez & M. Martinez Lasso, El Paso-Ciudad Juarez Relations and the
"Tortilla Curtain": A Study of Local Adaptation to Federal Border Policies 13-30 (1979) (El Paso
Council on the Arts & Humanities); Garcia y Griego, Employer Sanctions: Political Appeal, Administrative Dilemmas, AMERICA'S NEW IMMIGRATION LAW: ORIGINS, RATIONALES, AND POTENTIAL
CONSEQUENCES 53 (Cornelius ed. 1983); THE ENVIRONMENTAL FUND, THE OTHER SIDE 37, 38 (1984);
Loveman & Hofstetter, American Perceptions of Undocumented Immigrants: Political Implications,
9 NEW SCHOLAR III (1984).
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Inside the border region, undocumented immigration competes against
other issues, particularly economic and environmental ones. Take economic development, for example: the wage differential not only pulls
workers north to the U.S. side of the border to work in agriculture, the
service sector, construction, and even manufacturing, but has also motivated manufacturers to set up assembly plants in Mexican border cities.
Unlike offshore plants in Malaysia, Ireland, or the Caribbean, the Mexican
"offshore" connection has an important secondary effect; the wages earned
by Mexican nationals often find their way back to the United States in
retail purchases, thereby creating jobs in other sectors of the U.S. economy. The dark side of the border linkage occurs when there is a recession
in the United States, leading to a downturn in U.S. assembly plant activity
in Mexico, or when Mexico devalues the peso, forcing Mexican nationals
to buy Mexican, leading to a downturn among U.S. border retailers. 5
Even if there were an effective border closure that sealed off all undocumented immigration, there would continue to be environmental effects that would spill across the border. Sewage is a case in point. In the
twin cities of Calexico/Mexicali and San Diego/Tijuana, significant quantities of sewage flow downhill and north across the border, either unconfined as in Calexico's toxic New River or the daily piped flows from
Tijuana to San Diego's sewage treatment plant, occasionally accompanied
by fugitive flows from Tijuana into San Diego from areas not served or
served inadequately by Tijuana's sewage system. These two sites, Tijuana
and Mexicali, ranked first and second on the 1983 environmental agenda
in the meeting between President Reagan and President de la Madrid.
With respect to water, either potable or waste water, as an environmental
issue, it cannot be over emphasized that Mexico's first priority is to bring
potable water to its citizenry, while in the United States where potable
water is already available in most homes, effective sewage treatment
receives a higher priority than in Mexico. 6
5. E. Stoddard & J. West, The Impact of Mexico's Peso Devaluation on Selected U.S. Border
Cities (1977) (Tucson: Organization of U.S. Border Cities); Nalven, Prophets of Boom, Prophets
of Doom: The Future of Border Industrial Development in the San Diego-Tijuana Region, 2 CAMPO
LIBRE 153 (1984).
6. Other environmental problems haunt the border region. Notable among these are: Air pollution
from smelters in the El Paso, Texas, and Douglas, Arizona areas. In the near future, Mexico plans
to expand its own smelting capabilities in Sonora. S. Mumme, The Cananea Copper Controversy:
Lessons for Environmental Diplomacy (paper presented at the 32nd Annual Meeting of the Rocky
Mountain Council on Latin American Studies, 1984). Border toxics concerns range from illegal
import and application of banned pesticides as well as pesticide runoffs, increasing use of Mexico
for toxic waste disposal due to a lack of Class I sites in the United States, PCB contamination oil
resale, biocide contamination of foodstuffs, and untreated discharge of industrial wastes which travel
from Mexico into the United States. Border Toxics Coordination Team, Responses to the Border
Toxics Coordination Team Letter of Environmental Protection Agency, Region IX, San Francisco,
July II, 1984. From the Mexican side, there has been concern about the low-level nuclear waste
storage facility in Carlsbad, New Mexico. Mexican environmental specialists have questioned the
long-term containment of these wastes in deep salt-bed formations: what would happen if these
i
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The continued population growth of the border region, from 70,000
at the turn of the century to nearly 7 million by 1980' indicates that unless
effective strategies are implemented to manage transboundary environmental problems, the border environment will become significantly worse
and emotional reactions to failed attempts to cooperation will intensify.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL BORDER COOPERATION:
AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
The solutions to border environmental problems are often both national
and binational in scope and, as a result, must contend with considerable
jurisdictional ambiguity. This dual definition of border problem solving
can be readily appreciated when a U.S. congressman feels compelled to
suggest a foreign policy action to help his local district, in this case,
calling for a delayed opening of a new international crossing in order to
pressure Mexico into dealing with a binational sewage problem. "This
is a point of leverage that we have-opening the crossing .... If we
open it and develop the border, we'll have lost a point of leverage that
we won't be able to duplicate for the rest of this century. "8
There is a crucial ambivalence in U.S.-Mexican relations. While Mexico did receive assistance from the Agency for International Development
(AID) in the early 1960s, 9 it was dropped from this program in 1968 by
mutual agreement. Mexico no longer qualified under AID's formula for
underdeveloped nation status, and Mexico saw itself as moving along the
road to development, wanting to remove what many in Mexico perceived
as the stigma of dependency on the United States.'° Mexico, however,
still received U.S. "aid" for agricultural and narcotics programs," and
regional assistance from AID for programs such as family planning, as
well as a special U.S. purchase of petroleum to help Mexico overcome
a dollar-shortage crisis. There has been an emphasis in Mexico on renuclear wastes bled and contaminated underground water sources that end up in Mexico? V. Sanchez
& F. Ortiz, Considering Environmental Aspects in the Development Process Along the MexicoUnited States Border 45 (paper presented at the Bioresources and Environmental Hazards of the
United States-Mexico Borderlands Symposium, University of California, Los Angeles, Sept. 11-13,
1983). Actual radiation damage, far worse than what occurred at Three Mile Island, resulted from
the accidental mixing of cobalt-60 pellets into metal products in Cd. Juarez and shipped from there
to various places in the United States and Mexico in reinforcing rods and table pedestals. Associated
Press, Mexico cobalt peril said worse than TMI, San Diego Union, Mar. 29, 1984, at A 11.
7. Jamail, Voluntary OrganizationsAlong the Border, MEXICO-UNITED STATES RELATIONS 78, 81
(Purcell ed. 1981).
8. Lindquist, New Border Gate Opens on Sept. 17, 18-year Effort Creates Complex on Otay
Mesa, San Diego Union, Aug. 27, 1984 at A-I, col. 3.
9. United States Government, Annual Report 6 (AID 1961); Annual Report (AID 1964).
10. Telephone interviews with various sources in the U.S. Department of State, Treasury Department, and forrper employee of the Inter-American Foundation (1984).
11. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, TREATIES IN FORCE 112, 115 (1983).
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ceiving development assistance from multilateral sources such as the
World Bank" to which the United States is a prime contributor.
The United States has been ambivalent towards providing Mexico with
environmental assistance, particularly where the origin of the problem
has been in Mexico. In seeking official assistance for the border sewage
problem in San Diego, EPA staff were rebuked by Administration and
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) officials. EPA staff met with
strong opposition to any proposal to offer U.S. financial assistance
for pollution control to the Mexicans and a stern warning that offering
U.S. assistance for sewage treatment would set an unacceptable
precedent in dealing with other transborder pollution problems. OMB
officials reportedly believe other U.S.-Mexican border towns with
similar sewage problems, as well as border residents who are anticipating serious air pollution problems in connection with Mexican
copper smelters now under construction, would call for comparable
financial assistance. Since the White House encounter, sources say
EPA has taken the position that the Mexicans cause the problem and
they should solve it, and that the U.S. should focus its efforts on
getting the Mexicans to treat the sewage "south of the border." 3
Despite the reluctance of the present administration in Washington, D.C.
to set a precedent in providing environmental assistance, a precedent has
been set in working out a joint sewage treatment plant for the twin cities
of Nogales/Nogales Arizona and Sonora, by the International Boundary
and Water Commission.
The "Nogales model" employed cost-equivalents and discounted costs
where national requirements differed. For example, Mexico had no requirement for chlorination; thus, the chlorination costs were absorbed
completely by the United States. Furthermore, the United States paid
$1.1 million for the construction of the plant, while Mexico paid only
$0.9 million. The difference was due to higher construction costs in the
United States (which would have been lower had the plant been built in
Mexico with Mexican labor), as well as for the eight miles of pipe
necessary to carry the sewage from Mexico to the site of the treatment
plant in the United States. Operating costs were similarly prorated according to what the relative costs would be in each country. As one analyst
of this situation notes:
The introduction of these variables opened up a cost-differential
which could not be reasonably charged to the citizens of Nogales,
Arizona. It was therefore assumed by the U.S. Government, through
12.

WORLD BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 127 (1983).
13. OMB raps EPA for offering to finance Mexico borderpollution controls, 5 INSIDE E.P.A., I,

6 (Mar. 23, 1984).
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the U.S. section of the IBWC, and dubbed, "international costs."
The rationale for this expenditure is that the costs represent benefits
to the United States and to such U.S. interests as preventing untreated

sewage from crossing the boundary line into the United States.' 4
These "international costs" represent an equitable approach to transboundary environmental problem solving. However, the posture that each
side takes in rationalizing such costs becomes important to their justification for transboundary cooperation. Such costs can be rationalized as
"aid" to Mexico on the grounds of regional self-interest and the generosity
of a more able partner. Alternatively, such costs can be justified by
deemphasizing "aid" to Mexico, and interposing other rationales such
as compensation for other injuries, or the inequitable aspect of a more
developed country asking a less developed country to adopt its standards,
as well as the obligation of a more able partner.
Aid to Mexico
If it were stipulated that Mexico treat its own sewage before it entered
the United States, it would be clear that Mexico could not afford to do
so. Thus, by approaching sewage in both Nogales communities from a
joint regional treatment framework, Mexico would solve the problem
caused by having its sewage flow into the United States, as well as
improve the sewage-treatment problem in Nogales, Sonora. United States
participation in the project would guarantee the building of the treatment
plant. The United States would aid Mexico by carrying the costs of
chlorination and agree to a formula that would allow Mexico to pay lower
construction and operation costs.
Not Aid to Mexico
Although Mexico did recognize it was polluting its northern neighbor,
it would have had to redirect funds from higher priority development
projects to solve a problem with which many communities in Mexico
struggled. Should an underdeveloped nation solve problems according to
a timetable and set of standards of a developed nation? Furthermore, the
United States had contaminated Mexico's Mexicali Valley agricultural
area across from California by sending highly saline water as part of its
1944 treaty allotment from the Colorado River.' 5 Still, Mexico could
14. R. Duemling, San Diego and Tijuana: Conflict and Cooperation Between Two Border Communities 16 (Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, paper prepared for Executive Seminar
in National and International Affairs, May, 1980).
15. Telephone interview with U.S. State Department official who stated that "rehabilitation monies" were available to Mexico to correct the problems created by high salinity Colorado River water
sent to Mexico. This official also stated that Mexico has never billed the United States for corrective
measures. (Oct. 23, 1984).
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enter into a joint approach, but only to the extent that its costs reflected
Mexican project planning. For example, since Mexico does not use chlorination under its own treatment methods, then Mexico should not pay
for its use if the United States wished to chlorinate under its own regulations. If the United States picked up these costs entirely, rather than
dividing them in half, it would simply be paying a difference incurred
by its own higher standards, which would then not be considered "aid"
to Mexico.
However one chooses to view "international costs," the concept itself
is important. It allows joint projects to move forward; it maintains the
higher regulatory standards expected by U.S. participants; it removes an
added financial burden from Mexico of having to meet U.S. standards;
and it provides a language of claims where both participants can affirm
an equal decisionmaking role and an equitable division of costs in solving
a common problem.
A problem might be of such great magnitude or be perceived to so
unreasonably distort national priorities that even with international costs,
a joint project may be rejected or resisted. This is what happened with
the two proposals set forth to address the San Diego/Tijuana sewage
problem. 6 The sewage treatment solution originally proposed in San
Diego had a price tag of over $700 million. About $400 million of that
was allocable to Mexico for Tijuana sewage, including a deep ocean
outfall and a treatment plant of 100 million gallons daily capacity to the
year 2000. Even allowing for "international costs," Mexican participation
would literally have been overwhelmed by its share. The U.S. Congress
also balked at a massive treatment plant approach. It was willing to pay
$32 million for a plant to treat only the existing problem, further insisting
that the president certify Mexico's participation in the project. 7 Subsequently, Mexico sought a loan from the Inter-American Development
Bank (IADB) for $46.6 million, along with additional funding that Mexico itself would provide, to initiate a comprehensive $91 million program
to bring more potable water to Tijuana and to build its own sewer treatment
facilities. The United States threatened to cast its vote at the IADB against
Mexico's request if adequate guarantees were not made assuring that the
treatment facilities were timed to anticipate the introduc tion of new water
supplies to Tijuana and to assure that effluent flows would not find their
way to San Diego. Extensive negotiations were held in Tijuana and
Mexico City, involving local level officials from San Diego, and federal
and state office holders, as well as core U.S. diplomatic staff. These talks
produced good faith promises from Mexico rather than guarantees, be16. The events described cover the period from November 1983 through March 1985.
17. U.S. House of Representatives, H 8916 (1984).
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cause such guarantees would have infringed on the sovereignty of Mexico
to make its own decisions. With these assurances, the United States cast
its vote at the IADB in favor of Mexico's loan; at the same time, local,
state, and federal officials in the United States sought to reprogram the
congressional funds to build a "defensive" pipeline that would catch
fugitive flows and emergency spills. This sewage would be returned to
Mexico's conveyance channel to be carried south to a proposed aerationpond facility. " The follow-up process of formalizing these understandings, however, has left U.S. and Mexican technicians at odds about what
was in fact agreed to, leaving the agreement open to ambiguity, if not in
jeopardy. 9
The various formulas identified for a cooperative approach merit attention. In the first proposal, the United States called for a treatment
facility on its side of the border, similar to the approach taken at Ambos
Nogales. The IBWC commissioner had argued two years prior to this
proposal that the San Diego-Tijuana situation was parallel to the one in
Nogales.2' However, several problems stood in the way of a joint facility
located in San Diego. First, the long-term costs for sewage treatment, as
well as construction costs, remained an obstacle for Mexico. Second,
Mexico had already engaged in building its own solution which the United
States judged to be inadequate. Third, the U.S. Congress required certification of Mexican participation. One suggestion put forward by U.S.
participants would have allowed Mexico's previous efforts to be counted
as part of the project. The project would be defined more broadly than
simply a new facility, including other efforts directed at this sewage
problem. Ultimately, Mexico rejected a joint facility approach, deciding
to pursue its own course in fulfilling President de la Madrid's promise
to address Tijuana sewage flowing into San Diego. The United States
objected to Mexico's go-it-alone approach when it sought IADB funds,
arguing that the "solution" would still allow fresh-water flows (namely,
treated effluent) to cross the border and damage its salt-water estuarine
sanctuary. The United States abandoned the joint facility idea, seeking
instead an integrated, though independent, set of national projects. At
this point, it is well to consider the joint problem solving efforts as outside
of the framework suggested by the Nogales model. Here, the United
States used its vote at the IADB as a leverage to force Mexico into a
dual effort, clearly an aggressive approach to bringing both parties to the
18. Smolens, Panel Moves to Hold on to Federal Sewage Funds, San Diego Union, Feb. 26,
1985, at B-2; Roach, Sewage Bill Offers Hope for Border, San Diego Evening Tribune, Feb. 21,
1985, at B-I, col. 5.
19. Personal interview with officials of the Environmental Protection Agency, Mar. 21, 1985.
20. Nalven, The PoliticalProcess in Regional Planning:The San Diego-TijuanaSewage Disposal
Problem, CHANGE AND PERSPECTIVE IN LATIN AMERICA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1982 MEETING OF THE
ROCKY MOUNTAIN COUNCIL ON LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES 300, 310 (R. Bath ed. 1982).
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bargaining table. Mexico, for its part, was willing to examine U.S. suggestions. 2 1 In this second proposal, U.S. officials would have to convince
Congress that a defensive pipeline would meet the short-run objective of
addressing the sewage flows as well as would a treatment facility.
Not all transboundary environmental problems lend themselves to joint
problem solving. The San Diego-Tijuana sewage issue illustrates the
continuum from potential cooperation on a joint facility, to an independent
in-tandem approach, to a strictly independent approach, that is "we will
solve it ourselves, sans cooperation."
What is of interest are those transboundary efforts which seek to build
on mutual self-interest. The following section will analyze a specific joint
environmental project as it was perceived by the technicians themselves.
It will examine the way the participants explain their face-to-face relationship and, in particular, analyze the extent to which their explanations
incorporate an awareness of binational structural and cultural differences
as well as their developing mechanisms to cope with such differences.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL BORDER COOPERATION:

A JOINT-PROJECT PERSPECTIVE
At the micro-regional level, there is an element which strikes a sympathetic note amongst those interested in cross-border cooperation: the
binational communities can be viewed as forming a single, coherent
planning unit. This potential for a shared planning approach has led
several border residents to aspire to "true" cooperative ventures in managing the border environment.22 Interestingly, this approach received a
stimulus from two authorities in the field of urban and regional planning,
who were invited to San Diego to consider the future of the region. They
did not restrict their observations to what fell inside the boundaries of
the City of San Diego; they observed what fell inside the natural landscape
of the area. "[San Diego-Tijuana] is a single region, and a connected
social landscape as well, despite the barrier . . . ," and further urged,
"[w]e hope that officials and citizens will begin to see the division, to
understand that it is artificial, and that it is urgent that they attend to
it. "23

Despite the attractiveness of this vision of binational planning and
21. Mexico would likely have received the loan from IADB despite a negative United States
vote.
22. Planning-Together,San Diego Union, Aug. 10, 1980, at C-2; Applegate, TransnationalAir
Pollution, ECOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE BORDER REGION 127, 133 (S.Ross ed. 1983); Nalven,
Contra, EOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE BORDER REGION 147 (S.Ross ed. 1983); S. de Treville,

Wastewater Management Evaluation for the Tijuana River Estuarine Sanctuary 39 (Southwest Wetlands Interpretive Association, Imperial Beach, CA 1984).
23. D. Appleyard & K. Lynch, Temporary Paradise? A Look at the Special Landscape of the San
Diego Region 38 (City of San Diego Planning Department 1974).
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environmental management, little has been accomplished at a microregional level. 24 One obstacle is the sense members have of their political
community. Would, for example, the residents of San Diego want the
residents of Tijuana or, for that matter, Los Angeles, to vote on a bridge
in San Diego, or vice-versa? 25 Second, there are a welter of planning
issues that may be skewed by distinct cultural understandings about priorities, project pacing, matching of counterparts, and allocation of costs,
as well as the proper language for justifying cross-border cooperation.
Third, the proper involvement of federal, state, and local-level agencies
has, in many instances, an asymmetrical emphasis on both sides of the
border. At its most dramatic, local agencies take a lead role in land-use
issues on the U.S. side of the border, a tradition described as "home
rule" in the United States; Mexico, instead, emphasizes the central role
of federal agencies.
An important key to overcoming these obstacles to binational cooperation is to understand better the ambivalence and ambiguity of problem
solving in the border region. On the one hand, a technical planning
perspective can easily identify a common topography, meteorology, and
problems of urbanization in border "twin-cities" such as El Paso-Cd.
Juarez, or San Diego-Tijuana. To the extent that there is a universal
planning culture, or system of beliefs, ideas, and values, planners from
the United States and Mexico will share a common agenda in getting
their officials and citizens to see the problems of the border from a
binational, regional, planning perspective. On the other hand, planning
as an institutional activity of government may well be overridden by
hierarchically more important cultural domains-the culture of government bureaucracy as well as broad societal beliefs about national priorities. In this instance, U.S. and Mexican planners will themselves see
border cooperative relationships differently. Additionally, these planners
may function differently within their own bureaucratic environment, thereby
introducing additional handicaps to what is an exceptional relationship.
Following are several examples of attitudes and beliefs held by government personnel, particularly as these attitudes and beliefs directly and
indirectly affected binational cooperation. The data are drawn from a
study of a binational cooperative project between the San Diego Air
Pollution Control District (SD-APCD) and the Subsecretaria de Mejoramiento del Ambiente in Tijuana (SMA-TJ). 26
24. Jamail & Mumme, The InternationalBoundary and Water Commission as a Conflict Management Agency in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands, 19 Soc. Scl J. 45 (1982); Mumme & Nalven,
National Perspectives on Environmental Hazards, U.S.-MExico BORDER ATLAS (H. Applegate & J.
Nalven eds, forthcoming).
25. Nalven, supra note 20, at 301; Friedmann, Place, Politics, and the Market: The Loss and
Recovery of Territorial Values, 9 NEW SCHOLAR 147, 151 (1984).
26. The project began in 1977 and continues at a modest level to the present. It began with a
burst of enthusiasm, but quickly experienced difficulties, riding a roller-coaster of depression and
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The project was also touted by both Presidents Carter and L6pez Portillo
as having the potential to be a "model" for binational cooperation.27
While no "model" has emerged from this binational project after seven
years, several lessons in cooperation can be extracted from it.
One major influence on the degree and pace of cooperation can be
traced to the available resources, material, and personnel. San Diego
County's APCD had 100 staff positions, while Tijuana's SMA had five
regular staff positions. APCD's budget was $2.3 million, while Tijuana's
budget was about $65,000 in 1981 U.S. dollars. The ratio of resources,
comparing San Diego's APCD to Tijuana's SMA, was about twenty to
one in terms of staff positions, and thirty-five to one in terms of budget.
San Diego's APCD had extensive lab and monitoring facilities, while
Tijuana's SMA had no lab facilities and only particulate air monitors.
The capabilities of the APCD were built on twenty-five years of experience, while the SMA in Tijuana was about three years old. The difference
was magnified exponentially when one considers that the APCD was and
continues to be a single-purpose agency, while Tijuana's SMA is a multipurpose agency with a far greater range of responsibilities. Clearly, the
counterpart relationship was by no means equivalent. Yet both sides
deemphasized their differences in the initial deliberations over a joint,
binational project. The implication was that both the U.S. and Mexican
sides would contribute to the operation of the project. Commenting on
the balance of effort, a staff person at San Diego's APCD stated:
The 1977 agreement was, to me, a fifty-fifty project. That's what a
joint project is. We designed it together. Now, it's a Mexican-designed project which we will participate in. I would not call it a joint
project, but a cooperative effort. Before, neither side could do anything without the other. Now, they could do whatever they want,
and they can accept or reject our advice. The Subsecretaria can say,
"I have my own program." It now avoids the implication of being
a San Diego program or being under San Diego control. It's the face
saving device he's been looking for.28
More than the design of the program was at issue. The EPA, using the
San Diego APCD as a conduit, had offered the Mexican SMA expensive
gaseous monitoring equipment to be used in Tijuana. The loan, offered
officially for three years, would eventually have become permanent, in
effect, a gift.
The SMA personnel found themselves in a bind. If they accepted the
equipment loan, they would be obligated to use it. Because of limited
spirited renewals. In 1983, Mexico disbanded the Subsecretaria de Mejoramiento del Ambiente and
transferred its environmental activities to a new federal agency, Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano y
Ecologia.
27. Gray & White, Mexico's Macho Mood, 114 TIME 52 (Oct. 8, 1979).
28. Personal interview with staff person at Air Pollution Control District, December 1979.
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resources, however, they could not afford to use the equipment. But if
they refused the loan, they would appear to be spuming a generous offer
by friendly collaborators. The head of the Tijuana SMA office suggested
the following perspective for understanding Mexico's reluctance to accept
the loan. He referred to four transformations of a social transaction under
Latin law: 29
1. DO UT DES (Latin)
I give so that you will give.
doy para que des (Spanish)
2. FACIO UT DES
I do it so that you will give.
hago para que des
3. FACIO UT FACIAS
I do it so that you will do it.
hago para que hagas
4. DO UT FACIAS
I give so that you will do it.
doy para que hagas
He added, "the laws presume an ability to follow through, but there is
a gap, and Mexico is still a question mark, still struggling." "For Mexico,"
he continued, "one must add a qualifier-according to the possibilities
of each entity (en apego a las posibilidadesde cada organismo)."30 The
question he raises is fundamental. What kind of cooperative relationship
is it if one partner cannot fulfill his responsibilities in the same way or
to the same extent as the other partner?
The SMA official also believed, just as his counterpart at APCD, that
the program should be a joint one, a cooperation based on equal ability.
Mexico, he argued, wanted the program to operate along the lines of the
third tenet: each partner doing its share so that the other partner will do
likewise. However, the SMA representative saw the U.S. side emphasizing the fourth tenet in order to pressure Mexico into an immediate
start-up of the air monitoring activity: because the United States would
be lending the Mexicans equipment for a joint project, the Mexicans
ought to show good faith by beginning air monitoring-a something for
something.
The U.S. side had the assistance of an EPA consultant. His comments
on Mexico's reluctance to accept the loan and apparent reluctance to
begin air monitoring illustrate the kind of frustration that was common
to the local SMA and APCD participants:
The cost factor is almost nil. They could do (air monitoring) for a
year and then make a decision what to do thereafter. They can get
first-rate analytical results with little cost by using (APCD's equipment and capability). I was getting a lot of flak from EPA. "Why
29. Cf. NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW (1977).
30. Personal interview with staff person at the Subsecretaria de Mejoramiento del Ambiente,
January, 1979.
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are we lending all this equipment if they're not going to use it?"
Right now, things have quieted down because (the SMA) is doing
other things. I told (SMA) we have to show something---even a
modest effort. The ambient air monitoring is completely shut down.
There's a big difference between something and nothing. Even if the
quality is not the best, it's understandable because they are at the
beginning. Given a choice, I'd bet on disaster with Mexico, and
that's because of the assistant to the Subsecretary. 3"
What we find are not technical considerations creating tension in the
cooperative venture, but characterological and socio-cultural ones. Although both sides accepted the fact that the United States possesses the
expertise and the preponderance of technological resources, and that it
would assist Mexico, there was a difference in expectations as to what
the timetable for implementation should be. The U.S. side had a narrower
view of what should happen and when, as well as what constituted signs
of progress. The Mexican side was aware of the United States' narrower
perspective, but could not convince the U.S. side that the Mexican pace
was appropriate to its own resources:
Imagine if you were given some equipment to use, and you couldn't
use it because you didn't have the personnel. You would feel pressured. You'd be nervous. My plan is not as grandiose as (the first
one) but it is something we can do. . . .They had high expectations
at APCD, but we couldn't live up to them. 3"
Quite obviously, the social process of adjusting to developmental differences in joint border projects is not one that falls into place automatically. Indeed, each side might just as easily scurry for rationalizations
to fault the other as to seek accommodation. As a prod to the other, for
example, APCD and SMA characterized each other with distinct animal

imagery.
In a letter to the Air Quality Chief in Mexico City, the Chief Officer

of APCD wrote:
I am looking forward to meeting you in Reynosa (assuming I can
get authorization to attend), and am writing to update the status of
our Tijuana-San Diego Air Quality Project. Sometimes we call it the
Tortuga Project, but all things considered, we have made much progress in some areas. 33
31. Personal interview with Environmental Protection Agency consultant to the San Diego Air
Pollution Control District, January, 1979.
32. Personal interview with staff person at the Subsecretaria de Mejoramiento del Ambiente,
August, 1980.
33. Letter from San Diego County APCD Chief Officer to Subsecretaria de Mejoramiento del
Ambiente Chief of Air Quality, September 22, 1977.
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This letter was sent during the project's first phase. The executive
officer's attitude toward the project was extremely positive. By referring
to the project as the "Tortuga" (turtle) project, it is evident that he was
becoming impatient with the pace. The rapport established at the first
meeting appeared to be able to carry the teasing and the implication of
slowness conjured up by the image of a turtle. The turtle image is not
far distant from the more perjorative characterization of Mexicans, the
"mafiana" syndrome. There is no evidence that the Mexican SMA staff
equated the two; the use of the "turtle" image never became an issue in
itself, although it could have.
The animal imagery used by Mexico's SMA to portray this project was
radically distinct: it juxtaposed the "shark" and the "sardine." The image
is a cynical one, inasmuch as the shark is not merely larger than the
sardine; it is also a feared predator. The analysis of images provides
another dimension than what measurable indices can. One can easily
identify the vast difference in size of the U.S. and Mexican budgets, or
of the staff assigned to responsible agencies. However, the numbers do
not capture the different interpretations made by the participants: the time,
slowness image of U.S. participants, is set against the size and emotion,
predator image of Mexican participants.
Thus far, primarily the difference in levels of development has been
considered. Another difference can .be traced to the great degree of centralization in Mexican government and how this affects not only bureaucratic relationships, but also how information is treated. These differences
can affect cross-border cooperation. Take the question of information.
The U.S. government is constrained by the Freedom of Information Act,
while Mexico has no similar hindrance to curtailing the flow of information. How would a cooperative project deal with this difference? Presumably, if information from Mexico came to the United States, the U.S.
counterpart might be forced to release the information, which could then
reenter Mexico quite unexpectedly through the media. Precisely on this
point, the Mexican SMA queried their San Diego APCD counterparts.
To which the APCD officer replied:
You have asked whether we can treat data as confidential. Under
California and United States law, only trade secrets can be kept
confidential. However, I do not believe this rule would apply to data
concerning Mexican air quality and Mexican pollution sources.
Please be advised that we will honor any requests you or your
delegate make to keep data concerning Mexican air quality and Mexican pollution sources.
It is important that we have a free exchange of data across the
border. Any information we have that is not a trade secret will be
made available to you upon request.34
34. Letter from San Diego County APCD Chief Officer to Subsecretaria de Mejoramiento del
Ambiente Chief of Air Quality, September 22, 1977.
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The APCD officer is able to maintain the U.S. value of "free exchange
of data" while accommodating the Mexican value of treating data as
"confidential." This two-tier approach does not violate any U.S. right
(there is no right to Mexican government information) and preserves the
Mexican closed approach to information.
Moving beyond the APCD-SMA cooperative project, there are distinct
attitudes and beliefs held by U.S. and Mexican governmental personnel
which can affect their interpretation of events, if not their actual behavior
in cross-border situations. Two examples, growing out of a survey of San
Diego and Mexico City government staff, are suggestive of cultural blindspots."
Continuing the discussion about information, a question was posed
about what might be termed "dangerous," "hot," or "loaded" information. Such information is generally required to create a crisis situation
in order to activate government intervention. The Mexican and U.S.
responses are doubly opposed to each other, and probably reflect differences that correspond to a more versus a less centralized political system.
If someone discovers information which could undermine the agency's program or previous analysis, what should be his first course
.of action?36
A) Discuss it with others.
B) Go directly to supervisor.
C) Wait until he can consider more fully the significance of this new
information.
U.S. (58)
Mexico (43)
A
33%
-0B
55%
29%
C
12%
71%
No Mexican respondent chose the option to "discuss it with others,"
while one-third of the U.S. respondents did. In a highly centralized
system, such as in Mexico, one's loyalty is vertical, directed at higher
authorities. Given the absence of a civil service system to guarantee one's
career, Mexican government staff are ultimately dependent on the good
will of their superior or of the personal network that reaches up to power
centers at the state and federal levels. Discussing a "dangerous" situation
with others may in fact place two networks in competition.
The two remaining responses are inversely related among the U.S. and
35. Survey conducted by the author in San Diego, California, and Mexico, D.F. In San Diego,
the study population included the planning staff of the San Diego Association of Governments
(SANDAG, formerly Comprehensive Planning Organization) [18], the City of San Diego Planning
Department [20], and legislative and administrative assistants to the Mayor and City Council [20].
The interviews in San Diego were conducted in April, 1979. In Mexico, the study population included
staff from the Urban Ecology [19], Administrative [21], and other [3) divisions of the Secretaria de
Asentamientos Humanos y Obras Publicas (now Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologia). The
surveys in Mexico were conducted in June, 1979.
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Mexican respondents. It is of some note that the "wait" response is quite
low among U.S. respondents and quite high among Mexican respondents.
This difference in coping styles has been previously noted by psychologists. The American response, for example, deals with testing situations
more actively, while the Mexican response can be best characterized as
passive-obedient with better form and less anxiety or hostility.37 While
each response type has its advantages and disadvantages, the question
here is whether the opposition of these two styles, especially where the
participants are unaware of or have not thought through the strengths and
weaknesses of each approach, will handicap binational cooperative ventures, particularly as they encounter crisis situations.
Another area of interest is how U.S. and Mexican respondents characterize the developmental differences between both countries. This point
is a sensitive one, particularly when equality of status is a key to a joint
or linked decisionmaking process. One can imagine Mexican and U.S.
participants sitting together to work out the details of a border project.
Because of greater resources on the U.S. side, the United States may
offer or be expected to make a greater contribution, much like the equity
issue between the nations of the North and the nations of the South. Does
a greater material contribution, however, imply a change in the equality
of status in the decisionmaking process? Should the nation paying the
larger share be entitled to a larger role in deciding what is to be done?
Clearly, this is a point that Mexican participants wish to avoid at all
costs.3" From the Mexican viewpoint in particular, the implications of a
project are measured against a century-old relationship, a relationship
that is blamed for contributing to Mexico's present less developed status. 39
How important are the factors listed below in explaining the difference
in social and economic development in the United States and Mexico?
A) The individual's motivation for achievement is higher in the United
States than in Mexico.
B) The bureaucracy and policy-making process are more effective in
the United States than in Mexico.
C) Mexico's development has been stunted because of its dependent
and colonial-like ties to the United States.
36. Id.
37. Diaz-Guerrero, Mexicans and Americans: Two Worlds, One Border ... and One Observer,
in VIEWS ACROSS THE BORDER 283, 292-93 (S. Ross ed. 1978).
38. Personal interview with staff person at the Subsecretaria de Mejoramiento del Ambiente,
December, 1978.
39. R. Stavenhagen, Comments on Border Development (Conference on Border Urbanization,
San Diego State University, Feb. 17, 1977); Corredor, Mexico-United States Relations, U.S.-MEXICO
RELATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS 137, 138-43 (C. Reynolds & J. Tello eds. 1983); PineraRamirez, Border Communities as a Field of HistoricalInvestigation, 9 NEW SCHOLAR 135, 138-39
(1984).
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D) Mexico has not had the same degree of control over or access to
material resources as the United States (until very recently).
E) Cultural values in the United States have acted as a catalyst for
development, whereas in Mexico they have impeded effective and ongoing programs, especially the contrast of the values of teamwork versus
individualism.
These statements represent the following factors: A) individual achievement motivation; B) governmental process; C) international economic
linkages (dependency); D) resource accessibility; and E) cultural values.
Assigning percentages to each factor so they total 100 percent, responses
suggest a distinct national perspective for explaining the difference in
developmental status between Mexico and the United States. In Mexico,
the majority response centered, not surprisingly, on C) dependency, 37
percent; by contrast, the "dependency" explanation received the lowest
percentage from U.S. respondents, 13 percent. See Table 1.
StatusDifferences Mexico and U.S. Government Employees.
Table 1. Developmental

A)
B)
C)
D)
E)

Achievement Motivation
Governmental Process
Dependency
Control over Resources
Cultural Values

Mexico, 39
12%
17%
37%
20%
14%
100%

United States,58
14%
19%
13%
30%
25%
101%

135, 138-39 (1984).
Pinera-Ramirez, Border Communities as a Field of Historical Investigation. 9 NEWSCHOLAR

To the extent that this question captures attitudinal variation between
Mexican and U.S. planners as they attempt to explain or rationalize
differences in their respective levels of development, both highlight Mexico's coming late to control over its material resources. However, the
Mexican response emphasizes the rationale of Mexican economic dependency on the United States, while the United States response emphasizes the lack of necessary cultural values in Mexico as a catalyst for
development. The pointers of blame are certainly in conflict.
DISCUSSION
Transnational environmental problems, such as those considered here,
often require official remedial action. There is some hope that the 1983
Agreement between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Border
Area' can provide a framework for success. However, it can be said
with fairness that none of the participants expect the problem solving
40. Agreement for Cooperation on Environmental Programs and Transboundary Problems, Aug.
14, 1983 22 I.L.M. 1025 (1983).
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process to be simple or quick. There are several elements which handicap
problem solving efforts. As noted above, both sides are ambivalent about
U.S. aid to Mexico, although such aid would speed up remedial action.
The U.S. expectation for a fast timetable and higher environmental standards is met by the Mexican expectation of a more patient approach, one
that is sensitive to Mexico's inability to participate to the same degree
or pace as the United States because of less economic, material, and
human resources; the Mexican response is also tempered by its desire to
demonstrate independence of action.
Furthermore, in the border region, state and local jurisdictions play an
important role in many aspects of directing growth and managing the
environment on the U.S. side of the border. On the Mexican side, federal
agencies retain authority in these areas with some involvement of state
agencies. This lack of a one-to-one correspondence can be traced to a
home-rule tradition for local governments in the United States for land
use planning,4 1 as well as greater government centralization in Mexico
compared to a parcelling-out approach in the United States.42 This jurisdictional asymmetry need not, of course, be fatal to joint border projects,
as witnessed in the binational counterpart arrangement in the San Diego
APCD (county level) and Tijuana SMA (federal level) project.
Thus far, four assumptions about the border environment can be identified:
1) Growth predictions indicate increased population and development
of the U.S.-Mexico border region.
2) Government intervention is necessary for preventing significant environmental degradation.
3) Formulating and implementing government action follow distinct
institutional pathways in the United States and Mexico and are often
summarized as different emphases in the degree of government centralization.
4) Although the United States, as a developed nation, has greater
resources to contribute to binational projects than does Mexico, both
nations are ambivalent about direct concessionary aid going to Mexico.
Recurrent social and cultural patterns should be considered, particularly
as they affect the outcome of future binational projects. The data presented
here focused on a single binational project and consequently offer an
inadequate base for generalization. Nevertheless, it is worth sketching
out a framework for examining social and cultural features of binational
relationships which are obscured by a too narrow understanding of problem-solving, especially in a binational context.
41. Herzog, The Cross CulturalDimensions of Urban Land Use Policy on the U.S.-Mexico Border:
A San Diego-Tijuana Case Study, 22 Soc. Sci. J. 29, 36 (1983).
42. Ayres, The Future of the Relationship, in MEXICO-UNITED STATES RELATIONS 195, 196 (S.
Purcell ed. 1981).
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This analytical framework considers three features of binational cooperative relationships: transactions between nations with marked differences in economic and political power; transactions between political
systems which are asymmetrically organized in targeted issue areas; and
symbolic rationalization of those transactions.
Asymmetric Power
Official cooperative relations between nations run the gamut from treaties to memos of understanding to parallel but independent action. A
broad analysis would discuss not only formal treaties, but also outcomes
that result from the participation of informal delegations, such as a contract between one country and a business consortium from another country. In fact, a typology has been postulated to capture a range of binational
products between solely formal delegations and between mixed formal
and informal delegations.43 In a discussion of fishery negotiations, a
generic four-phase model of "treaty talking" was proposed: recognition
of problem; agreement on concepts; data collection/analysis; and preparation of documents."
Although there are a range of substantive problems between the United
States and Mexico, most are similarly influenced by national differences
in economic development. This difference surfaces in the "agreement on
concepts" phase, in which the equities of participation must be satisfactorily resolved. Miller and Broches are encouraged by the potential of
mixed formal and informal binational delegations "because sensitive national policies and principles can be overlooked in favor of prudent business practices. Thus, the use of informal delegations presents unanticipated45
dividends by reducing unrelated and formal posturing over issues."
However, the use of the private sector (informal delegation) in negotiating
an "arrangement" in lieu of a formal binational accord is unlikely in the
area of transnational environmental problems .46Exploiting a natural resource can attract private capital, while improving the environment often
implies a fiscal cost. In other words, it is not at all clear how a profit
can be guaranteed in resolving transnational environmental problems unless, of course, a formula is worked out where the developed nation, for
example, co-signs payment schedules. This type of guarantee is not unlike
the international costs formula developed for the Nogales sewage-treatment plant discussed earlier.
43. Miller & Broches, Observations on Mexico-U.S. FisheryNegotiations, 9 NEW SCHOLAR 231
(1984).
44. Id. at 232-33.
45. Id. at 240.
46. The idea of privatization has been suggested for building a sewage treatment plant for resolving
the San Diego-Tijuana sewage problem. Of the two financing problems, construction and operation/
maintenance costs, the latter is anticipated to be the more difficult. Personal interview with C.
Whitney, Sacramento CA, October, 1984.
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Role Relationship

EQUAL

DECISIONMAKING
CONTRIBUTION

Participatory
Contribution

Equal role in
designing the
joint project

(I)

RESOURCE
CONTRIBUTION

Equal shares
in dollars
or equivalents
CII)

UNEQUAL

Mexico is wary
that accepting aid
will diminish status
and right to make its
own decision
(IV)

"Fair" share:
U.S. must pay a
greater percentage
based on higher
standards and costs
in U.S.
(Itt)

FIGURE 1. A Social Process Model of Environmental Cooperation.
Thus, the "agreement on concepts" phase related to U.S.-Mexico environmental issues will likely require a formal binational approach, and
U.S. and Mexican delegations will continue to confront "sensitive national policies" and be mindful of national postures. This typology is
precisely how national postures in the "agreement on concepts" phase,
either for the generic developed/underdeveloped nation situation or for
the specific U.S.-Mexico case, can be structured by differences in the
levels of economic development.
Consider a social-process model that focuses on the evolution of technical relationships between nations of markedly different development
status (see Figure 1). The situation is one in which both parties seek an
equal status in the problem-solving process (step 1). They face an important issue in their search for an agreement in concept, namely, the
relative contribution each side expects to make. Will participation be a
straightforward fifty-fifty proposition, calculated in equal dollars/pesos,
or an in-kind or equivalent compensation proposition (step 2)?
Problems will likely arise in large-scale projects where material contributions represent a greater fiscal strain for the less developed country.
For the project to move forward, the developed nation must subsidize
the project in some manner. As discussed previously, a creative approach
was developed in the Nogales situation under the phrase "international
costs." The status of both parties in the decisionmaking process may well
be affected by an unequal material contribution. The developed nation
may acquire, by demand or acquiescence, a greater status in the rela-
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tionship (step 3). Clearly, the outcome can vary between paired nations.
However, in the U.S.-Mexico relationship, Mexico has been cautious
about its image of independence from the United States and would likely
resist "assistance" in any form if accepting aid resulted in a status change
(step 4). The United States has, of course, many interests in Mexican
affairs. It may well be that U.S. assistance in one area would not necessarily incur a change of status in the same project; however, assistance
in one project might prove opportune in bilateral talks seeking trade-offs
between a variety of issue areas such as trade or immigration.
Also, it is unlikely that the United States would provide assistance for
a project intended to address an environmental problem that, at the same
time, lowers its own environmental standards.47 In effect, the assistance
would keep the ante fairly high in terms of project cost, thereby inducing
Mexico to make a greater contribution than it would have had to make
had the problem been totally ignored, delayed, or treated in a far less
comprehensive manner. Thus, the United States would indirectly gain a
greater role in the problem solving process by stipulating the nature of
an adequate solution. Should neither country yield to an acceptable mix
of equality in the role relationship and participatory contribution to the
project (either III-IV or I-III), then the cooperative effort would disintegrate (step 5). These steps indicate the nature of the social process that
can be anticipated in binational cooperation where the delegations represent different levels of economic, fiscal, and technological development.
Tensions can emerge as each party tries to impose its definition on the
appropriate level of cooperation. In the APCD/SMA air-pollution-control
project, both parties expressed their dissatisfaction with what binational
cooperation entailed. From the U.S. vantage point, the Mexican officials
had usurped a larger role in their project as they begged off accepting a
loan of air monitoring equipment from the United States and charted their
own course of action.
From the Mexican vantage point, the U.S. insistence upon action, upon
accepting a loan of equipment, and upon following a technically adequate
methodology represented pressure, a pressure to reach a level of attainment beyond their capabilities: "Imagine if you were given some equipment to use, and you couldn't use it because you didn't have the personnel.
You would feel pressured. You'd be nervous."48
47. Letter from Stephen Mumme to author (Jan. 9, 1985): "Interestingly, however, the wording
of the Clean Water Act does allow for that to happen, by excepting IBWC's agreements from the
enforcement of domestic standards. That is exactly what happened in the case of Minute 264 and
New River, which do not require compliance with U.S. clean water standards." The insistence, or
lack of insistence, on U.S. environmental standards in transboundary issues ultimately turns on the
sense that U.S. officials have of state and local demands and political clout, on the one hand, and
of Mexican interests, willingness, and resources, on the other.
48. Personal interview with staff person at the Subsecretaria de Mejoramiento del Ambiente,
August, 1980.
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Clearly, the difference in development levels intruded into the concrete
social relationship as different expectations for project implementation.
The U.S. side was impatient with Mexico's apparent slowness and reluctance to accept assistance; the Mexican side felt pressed by those
selfsame U.S. sentiments and reacted by distancing itself from the original
scope and pace of activity.
Asymmetric Organization
Official U.S.-Mexico joint ventures, especially as they originate at the
local and state level, must also be viewed as transactions between political
systems which are asymmetrically organized in targeted issue areas. For
example, "national security" issues do not fall into this category inasmuch
as these issues are federal concerns in both the United States and Mexico.
However, other issues, such as fugitive sewage flows across the international boundary, are simultaneously the concern of local, state, and
federal agencies on the U.S. side of the border. In Mexico, due to its
centralized structure, this issue falls primarily within the domain of federal
authorities. Generally speaking, local-level agencies on the U.S. side of
the border (public health departments, water districts, sewer agencies,
city and county planning departments, and other similar bodies) are notably present in the public debate and problem solving process concerning
Mexico

U.S.
federal level

_..-

/

/

-

state level

-

-

.

local level

Formal Relationships
Informal or Quasi-Formal
Relationships
FIGURE 2. Relationships Between Environment-Related Agencies: U.S.-Mexico
Border Regional Issues.
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transboundary environmental issues; by contrast, such counterpart locallevel authorities on the Mexican side of the border are conspicuous by
their absence.
Intergovernmental binational relationships can be viewed from a number of vantage points. At the federal level, environmental problems are
discussed as formal binational concerns, particularly with reference to
the 1983 binational border environmental agreement. There is an equivalence of understanding: agency representatives address counterparts with
equal status. However, the scope of authority is distributed differently in
each nation. This becomes quite evident when environmental concerns
are viewed at the point of impact (the border region) and from the perspective of local jurisdictions. A county air pollution officer on the U.S.
side of the border has no municipal counterpart on the Mexican side of
the border. Local agencies must either percolate their concerns to Mexico
through Washington, D.C., and/or develop informal or quasi-formal relationships with federal and, to a lesser extent, state, agencies in Mexico.
Border state agencies, unlike local agencies, do have counterparts; but,
like local agencies, their relationships must either be filtered through
federal agencies to be formally noted or must pursue a more tenuous and
informal state-to-state approach." 9
In 1978 when EPA developed a memo of understanding with Mexico's
SMA, the reaction of San Diego's APCD to the memo was one of distress.
The input of local agencies was subsumed under "other cooperative
activities." The chief officer of APCD stated, "Frankly, I'm disappointed.
From our point of view, this is next to nothing." 5 0 If this same officer
were dealing with the State of California, or with neighboring Imperial
County, he would expect direct relations and formal status recognition.
With neighboring Tijuana, the relationship was informal. Indeed, Mexico
City officials related their surprise to EPA officials that "the major action
is taken by locals."'" For this reason San Diego APCD staff worked
toward the development of a quasi-formal agreement with Mexico's SMA.
Although federal officials in Washington, D.C. and Mexico City reviewed
the final memo of understanding and gave it tacit approval by permitting
it to develop, it was signed by the San Diego County APCD and the State
of Baja California's Department of Environmental Improvement and Control on April 4, 1981. While the document had no official diplomatic
status, it helped legitimize the actual interaction between air pollution
control staff located in San Diego and Tijuana.
49. Informal contacts draw upon the rapport of face to face meetings, often heightening a perception of accomplishment. This perception is muted when federal agencies, thousands of miles
distant from the border region, take the lead in the problem-solving process.
50. San Diego APCD, inter-office correspondence, May 30, 1978.
51. San Diego APCD, inter-office correspondence, December 19, 1978.
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The perspective of local-level, U.S. border jurisdictions has been studied by binational political analysts2 Binational cooperative efforts in the
1970s were discovered to be focused on a narrow range of common
jurisdictional interests, such as fire control and law enforcement, and the
symbolic maintenance of "sister-city" relations. 3 Larger issues, such as
border economic development, land use planning, and environmental
control measures, remain fractious as areas for joint endeavors. Suggestions have been made to incorporate the informal, binational, social reality
into a more functional concept of border management. 4 However, the
Mexican view would probably resist a shift away from a structural perspective that emphasizes territorial sovereignty and the integration of its
northern border states into the Mexican federal structure, notwithstanding
recent efforts to decentralize some aspects of Mexico's bureaucracy and
its pattern of national economic growth. 5
Symbolic Rationalization
Let us imagine, for a moment, a conference table with a randomly
drawn group of technical staff from the United States and Mexico. To
what extent, we might ask, would their discussions of border problems
be phrased in concepts common to a universal planning language, and
to what extent would their discussions be skewed by U.S. or Mexico
centered planning perspectives? The first response trades on expected
technical concerns, namely, whether both U.S. and Mexican personnel
hold the same views on what is "appropriate" technology. This article
has specifically avoided this area of discussion in order to address the
neglected area of social and cultural aspects of binational technical relationships. However, it is worth noting in passing that the choice of
technology is not a mere reflection of relative resource capabilities. Legislated environmental standards can also affect technology choices. For
example, the San Diego APCD and the U.S. EPA offer of gaseous monitoring equipment to Mexico's SMA represented U.S. requirements to
monitor contaminants such as hydrocarbons and ozone; at that time,
Mexican standards were set at the simpler concern for particulates (dust
and smoke). Thus, the gaseous monitoring equipment, though important
to Mexican technical staff broad interests, was not appropriate for the
then current legislative standards in Mexico. At this point, relative re52. D'ANTONI & FORM, INFLUENTIALS IN Two BORDER CITIES: A STUDY OF COMMUNITY DECISIONMAKING (1965); Sloan & West, Informal Policy Making in U.S.-Mexico Border Cities, 58 Soc. Sci
Q. 270 (1977).
53. Sloan & West, supra note 53, at 280.
54. Stoddard, supra note 2.
55. Cf. Mexican attitudes on autonomy in border economic relations: LEYVA-MORTERA, EL NACIONALISMO REVOLUCIONARIO EN BAJA CALIFORNIA (1983); Tamayo, La FronteraNorte de Mexico
y la Crisis de 1982: Algunos Comentarios Preliminares, 1 ESTUDIOs FRONTERIZOS 153 (1983).
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source capabilities did enter the picture. The SMA budget was hardly
large enough to fund the then current environmental program in Mexico,
let alone provide added staff time to develop expertise about a more
advanced understanding of air pollution, a level of pollution control outside of legislative mandates.
Our concern here is with the social and cultural aspects of U.S.-Mexico
technical relationships. While these aspects would likely be excluded as
technical topics by the technicians themselves, they do represent a dynamic which affects the process of project implementation-whether delays arise because one side misunderstands the other's expectations, whether
attitudes can be modified on the extent and characterization of "aid,"
and generally how each side interprets the sincerity and validity of the
other side's efforts. The domain of beliefs and values enters into the
technician's perception of problem-solving, though they are not subjected
to the same critical examination by the participants themselves as is the
technical content of the problem at hand. The thrust of the examples
provided in this article, about the symbolism of the animal imagery used
by the project participants, the analysis of different expectations of the
quidpro quo, the different attitudes towards the publicness of government
information, the differences in response styles to "crisis" information,
and the clash of "dependency" and "cultural values" as explanations of
differences in developmental status, all point to substantial and lively
contrasts between Mexican and U.S. perspectives about what problem
solving is about.
Two points are in order. First, while most of the social and cultural
examples provided can be directly related to the political and developmental asymmetries discussed above, they are not mere reflections or
epiphenomena of these asymmetries. For instance, the observation that
the United States is far more developed economically than Mexico does
not provide an automatic insight into why both the United States and
Mexico are ambivalent over aid, nor why considerable time is expended
in developing an "international costs" formula such as the one used in
the Nogales sewage treatment plant. Likewise, the observation of a political asymmetry between the United States and Mexico does not forestall
a mix of binational local-state, local-federal, and state-state arrangements.
To be sure, these developmental and political asymmetries constrain the
options available for binational cooperation as well as provide important
rationales for interpreting outcomes. Thus, while U.S. local-Mexican
federal relationships can be observed in binational cooperative projects,
they are quasi-formal arrangements rather than what is normatively expected within the framework of a formal, diplomatic, binational agreement. In this case, the political asymmetry between the two nations is
tempered by the informal social reality of border relations.
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Second, after establishing general social and cultural aspects of official,
binational U.S. -Mexico relationships, it should be clear that the pragmatic
utility of these insights comes with contextualization. In order to avoid
national character stereotype-the U.S. official perceives and does "this,"
the Mexican official "that"-the social and cultural differences and similarities must be appropriately situated. Each issue invokes a different set
of state and non-state actors, a different set of standards and laws, a
different set of fiscal priorities, a different set of transborder accomplishments and failures, as well as a distinct pattern of how these sets fit
together. Moreover, this complex of actors, ideas, and resources has
important variations at the federal, state, and local levels of government
as well as in border-regional and national-capital settings. A more precise,
surgical analysis can be conducted to pinpoint how attitudinal and behavioral differences influence and are in turn shaped within each issuearea complex. Such an analysis may appear repetitive; however, the state
of knowledge of how the border is transacted and rationalized is not yet
commonplace.
CONCLUSION
The major thrust of this article has been to analyze the social and
cultural aspects of binational, technical, cooperative relationships. While
participants in such relationships focus on technical content, engineering
design, and cost analysis, the strength of their relationship is more than
good will applied to technical problem-solving. Given the asymmetries
of power and governance, not to mention the differences of heritage and
language, a sustained analysis such as elaborated here would appear useful
to making the search for transnational solutions more realistic.

